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DDAS Accident Report 
Accident details 
Report date: 07/07/2011 Accident number: 640 
Accident time: 11:30 Accident Date: 28/09/2010 
Where it occurred: AF/3203/07956, 
MF0034, Gosha 
Village, Tani District, 
Khost Province 
Country: Afghanistan 
Primary cause: Inadequate training (?) Secondary cause: Field control 
inadequacy (?) 
Class: Missed-mine accident Date of main report: 29/11/2010 
ID original source: None Name of source: UNMACCA 
Organisation: [Name removed]  
Mine/device: PMN-2 AP blast Ground condition: not recorded 
Date record created:  Date  last modified: 07/07/2011 
No of victims: 1 No of documents: 1 
 
Map details 
Longitude:  Latitude:  
Alt. coord. system: Not recorded Coordinates fixed by:  
Map east:  Map north:  
Map scale:  Map series:  
Map edition:  Map sheet:  
Map name:   
 
Accident Notes 
protective equipment not worn (?) 
visor not worn or worn raised (?) 
inadequate investigation (?) 
mine/device found in "cleared" area (?) 
 
Accident report 
The only report of this accident that has been made available to date is a UNMACCA Lessons 
Learned document. Its conversion into a DDAS file has led to some of the original formatting 
being lost. Text in square brackets [ ] is editorial. This record will be revised if more 
information becomes available. 
The document is reproduced below, edited for anonymity. 
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 LESSONS LEARNED SUMMARY OF [Demining group] DEMINING ACCIDENT  
INTRODUCTION:  
The demining investigation team was convened by AMAC Southeast to investigate the 
causes of demining accident occurred to [Demining group] involving Mr. Rasool Badshah S/O 
Syal Badshah the de-miner of [Demining group] CBDT-13. The accident occurred on 28 Sep 
2010 at 11:30am in task No. AF/3203/07956/MF0034 located in Gosha village, Tani district of 
Khost province. 
SUMMARY: 
Task number AF/3203/07956/MF0034 is located on the top of a hill on west side of Gosha 
village. The area was mined by Russian troops during 1987-1992 to prevent their positions 
from the attacks of Mujahidin. The area was polygon surveyed by [Demining group] LIAT in 
November 2009, [Demining group] CBDT-13 started clearance operations there on 10 Dec 
2009. 74% of the task was cleared and 53 AP mines destroyed by the team till the accident 
happened. 
According to the witness statements and the physical observation of the accident point, the 
accident happened while the de-miner was walking from the rest area to his clearance lane. 
He stepped on missed PMN anti-personnel mine in cleared area. Therefore, this mine was 
missed during the clearance operation. The exploded mine resulted in below knee amputation 
of deminer’s right leg, multiple injuries on his left leg, left foot heel, right hand palm and some 
minor injuries on his right arm. The de-miner was sent to Khost hospital after receiving first 
aids in the site. While accident happened the de-miner did not have PPE on, he was walking 
in cleared area to proceed to his clearance lane after the break time. 
The previous team leader of this team was shifted to other CBD project by [Demining group] 
and the new team leader was appointed to this team from the community. The QC check had 
not been conducted by section leader and team leader on the cleared lane where the mine 
was missed. 
CONCLUSIONS: 
A missed mine caused this accident.  
RECOMMENDATIONS:  
The following points are to be considered by [Demining group]: 
• [Demining group] operations department should make sure that the command group 
of the teams are conducting QC checks of the cleared ground as outlined in 
[Demining group] QM SOP, section 24-1. 
• The command group should make sure that the detectors are tested and 
compensated to the ground on daily basis.  
• [Demining group] operations department should develop and implement a capacity 
development plan for their teams especially the CBD teams as the majority of 
[Demining group] accidents are relating to CBD projects.  
• The deminers should check their detectors prior to start operations after any break. 
[The detector is use was the Ceia.] 
Feedback on any preventive and corrective actions taken by [Demining group] is required to 
be submitted to the MACCA within 7 days, effective from the issue of this report. 
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 Victim Report 
Victim number: 823 Name: [Name removed] 
Age:  Gender: Male 
Status: deminer  Fit for work: not known 
Compensation: Not made available Time to hospital: Not made available 
Protection issued: Frontal apron 
Long visor 
Protection used: None 
 
Summary of injuries: 
INJURIES: minor Arm, severe Foot, severe Hand, severe Leg 
AMPUTATION/LOSS: Leg Below knee 
COMMENT: No Medical report was made available. "below knee amputation of deminer's 
right leg, multiple injuries on his left leg, left foot heel, right hand palm and some minor injuries 
on his right arm". 
 
Analysis 
The primary cause of this accident is listed as Inadequate training because the investigators 
recommended improved metal detector training to avoid missing mines. The secondary cause 
is listed as a Field Control Inadequacy because the area had not been subjected to an 
internal QA check and should not have been treated as clear until that check had been 
completed. The failure of the demining group’s managers to ensure that appropriate training 
was conducted and appropriate QA checks took place was a significant Management Control 
Inadequacy. 
Metal detector checks and calibration should be conducted regularly throughout the day 
because battery condition can deteriorate rapidly, and temperature variations can adversely 
effect ground calibration. The number of problems with this Ceia detector in this theatre raises 
questions about both the detector model and the training. 
The “Inadequate investigation” listed under notes refers to the absence of a full accident 
report. The UN supported MACCA has failed to make these widely available for some years, 
so ignoring the requirements of the IMAS. It is noteworthy that the Afghan national staff have 
been more responsible than those internationals who presume greater responsibility. 
 
3 
